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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
BRANDON CAIRE, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * Civil Action No. RDB-13-1216




This is an employment discrimination case in which the Plaintiff Brandon Carre 
asserts claims against Defendants Conifer Value-Based Care, LLC, formerly known as 
InforMed, LLC1 (“InforMed”), and InforMed’s Director of Human Resources Janet Camp 
(“Camp”) (collectively, “Defendants”)2 for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act of 
1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”); the Maryland Human Relations Act, Md. Code 
Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606; and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code 
Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501, etseq. Pending before this Court are Defendant Janet Camp’s 
Motion To Compel Arbitration or, in the Alternative, To Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim (ECF No. 10) and Defendant Conifer Value-Based Care, LLC’s Motion To Compel
1 Defendant Conifer Value-Based Care, LLC is the surviving entity of a 2013 merger between 
InforMed and another firm. Throughout this Memorandum Opinion, this Court will refer to this 
Defendant by the name of the entity that employed the Plaintiff—InforMed.
2 The Plaintiffs claims against Conifer Health Solutions, LLC have been dismissed. See Order 
Granting Voluntary Stip. of Dismissal, ECF No. 20.
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Arbitration or, in the Alternative, To Dismiss Counts Three and Four for Failure to State a 
Claim (ECF No. 11). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is 
necessary.3 See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ 
Motions (ECF Nos. 10 & 11) are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This Court accepts as true the well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations in the
plaintiffs’ complaint. See Aziz v- Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). In August
of 2010, the Plaintiff Caire applied for employment with InforMed, and on September 9,
2010 received an offer letter setting forth various details of the terms and conditions of
employment. Compl. ^  12, 73-47, ECF No. 1. The offer letter did not refer to arbitration
in any way. Id. ^ 73. On October 4, 2010, he began working for InforMed as an entry-level
telephone customer service representative at company headquarters in Annapolis, Maryland.
Id. ^ 74. On his first day of work, the Plaintiff received an employee handbook, which
contained the following arbitration provision:
If an employment dispute arises while you are employed at InforMed, the 
company requests that you agree to submit any such dispute arising out of 
your employment or the termination of your employment (including but not 
limited to, claims of unlawful termination based on race, sex, age national 
origin, disability, breach of contract or any other bias prohibited by law) 
exclusively under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C., Section 1. Similarly, 
any disputes arising during your employment involving claims of unlawful 
discrimination or harassment under federal or state statutes shall be submitted 
exclusively to binding arbitration under the above provisions. This arbitration 
shall be the exclusive means of resolving any dispute arising out of your 
employment or termination from employment by InforMed or you, and no 
other action can be brought by employees in any court or any forum.
3 The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Surreply and Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 23), 
which was unopposed by the Defendants. The Motion for Leave to File Surreply is GRANTED, 
and this Court has considered the Plaintiff’s additional arguments.
2
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By simply accepting or continuing employment with InforMed, you 
automatically agree that arbitration is the exclusive remedy for all disputes 
arising out of or related to your employment with InforMed and you agree to 
waive all rights to a civil court action regarding your employment and the 
termination of your employment with InforMed; only the arbitrator, and not a 
judge or jury, will decide the dispute.
If you decide to dispute your termination or any other alleged incident during 
your employment, including but not limited to unlawful discrimination or 
harassment, you must deliver a written request for arbitration to InforMed 
within one (1) year from the date of termination, or one (1) year from the date 
on which the alleged incident(s) or conduct occurred, and respond within 
fourteen (14) calendar days to each communication regarding the selection or 
an arbitrator and the scheduling or a hearing. If InforMed does not receive a 
written request for arbitration from you within one (1) year, or if you do not 
respond to any communication from InforMed about the arbitration 
proceedings within fourteen (14) calendar days, you will have waived any right 
to raise any claims arising out of the termination of your employment with 
InforMed, or involving claims of unlawful discrimination or harassment, in 
arbitration and in any court or other forum.
You and InforMed shall each bear respective costs for legal arbitration at any 
such arbitration. The parties, if any, shall share the cost of the arbitrator and 
court reporter, equally.
Pls.’ Opp., Decl. of Brandon Caire Ex. 2, ECF No. 18-2 at 10 (“Arbitration Policy”). Caire
alleges that he was not given time to read the handbook and further alleges that he did not
know it contained an arbitration provision. Id. ^ 75. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff was required
to sign a page of the Employee Handbook containing an “Acknowledgment of and
Agreement with InforMed Arbitration Policy,” which states:
My signature on this document acknowledges I understand the above 
Arbitration Policy and agree to abide by its conditions. I also acknowledge 
that I understand my employment is at-will and may be terminated at any 
time, with or without reason, by either InforMed or myself. I further agree 
that, in accordance with InforMed’s Arbitration Policy I will submit any 
dispute - including but not limited to my termination - arising under or 
involving my employment with InforMed to binding arbitration within one (1) 
year from the date the dispute first arose. I agree that arbitration shall be the
3
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exclusive forum for resolving all disputes arising out of or involving my 
employment with InforMed or the termination of that employment. I agree I 
will be entitled to legal representation, at my own cost, during arbitration. I 
further understand that I will be responsible for half the costs of the arbitrator 
and any incidental costs of arbitration.
ECF No. 18-2 at 12. This document included signature lines for the employee and a 
“Designated Manager.” Id. In addition, the Plaintiff was required to sign a “Receipt and 
Acknowledgment of InforMed Employee Manual” which contained the following language:
Understanding and Acknowledging Receipt of Informed Employee Manual
I have received and read a copy of the InforMed Employee Manual. I 
understand that the policies and benefits described in it are subject to change
at the sole discretion of InforMed at any time.
* * *
Arbitration
I also acknowledge that I have read and understand the Arbitration Policy 
contained in this Employee Manual and I agree to abide by the policy.
ECF No. 18-2 at 13. The Arbitration Policy, the Acknowledgment of and Agreement with
InforMed Arbitration Policy, and the Receipt and Acknowledgment of InforMed Employee
Manual collectively form the arbitration agreement at issue in this case.
Shortly after beginning work at InforMed, Caire took time off of work to address
health issues including Major Depressive Disorder and severe social anxiety disorder. Id. ^
17-18. The Plaintiff s direct supervisor, Kathy Howard, was aware that he was undergoing
regular psychiatric treatment, as was InforMed’s Human Resources Director, Defendant
Camp. Id. ^  19-20. Despite his mental health conditions, between his hiring in October
2010 and May 2011, the Plaintiff met or exceeded the level of performance expected of an
on-site telephone customer service representative. Id. ^ 16.
Because telephone customer service representatives are not required to interact face-
to-face, InforMed routinely encouraged and allowed employees to telecommute as a cost­
4
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saving measure. Id. ^ 21. In May of 2011, at InforMed’s suggestion, the Plaintiff agreed to 
telecommute from home. Id. ^ 22. The Plaintiff signed a “Staff Employee Telecommuting 
Request Form” and a “Telecommuting Agreement,” and InforMed approved him to begin 
telecommuting from home effective on or about June 1, 2011. Id. ^  23-24. As a result of 
the new arrangement, the Plaintiff incurred costs for office supplies and services necessary to 
work from home. Id. ^  25-27. InforMed paid a flat monthly stipend of $160 to help defray 
these costs. Id. ^ 28. In setting up his home office, the Plaintiff changed his land line 
telephone number so that he could use it for work purposes with minimal interruption from 
personal calls. Id. ^ 29. The Telecommuting Agreement did not require telecommuters to 
maintain multiple phone lines, and it was common for InforMed’s telecommuting employees 
to use just one phone line for InforMed purposes during business hours and for personal 
purposes at other times of the day. Id. The Plaintiff alleges that Sarah Doty, a customer 
service representative at InforMed who began telecommuting approximately one month 
after the Plaintiff, stated that she and “everyone else in our department” had only one phone 
line and this fact was known to management. Id. ^ 30. However, near the end of the 
Plaintiff s employment with InforMed, supervisor Ms. Howard sent an email on January 27, 
2012 to all telecommuting customer service representatives instructing them, “In the future: 
Make sure you have a dedicated InforMed line if you are remote and make sure you are not 
using the InforMed line for personal use.” Id. ^  60-61.
Similarly, InforMed permitted “incidental and occasional” use of company equipment 
by employees for personal reasons with prior manager approval; in practice, no manager 
approval was required. Id. ^  34-35. In addition, the Plaintiff was not required to maintain
5
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an InforMed greeting on his land line voicemail. Id. ^ 47. InforMed used a self-contained 
voice mail system, meaning that any time a customer service representative was unavailable 
to answer a call, the caller would be routed directly to InforMed’s company voicemail box. 
Id. ^ 43. However, in or around the fall of 2011, a malfunction in InforMed’s system failed 
to route calls to the internal voicemail box. Id. ^ 46. This failure caused InforMed calls to 
be routed to the Plaintiff s personal voicemail greeting from his previous land line, dating to 
a time before he changed the number to begin telecommuting. Id. The Plaintiff contacted 
his telephone service provider and ensured that no further InforMed-related calls would be 
routed to a personal voicemail greeting. Id. ^ 49.
During the Plaintiff s employment as a telecommuter from his Maryland home, his 
grandmother began undergoing cancer treatment. Id. ^ 37. As a result, the Plaintiff 
requested that he be allowed to telecommute temporarily from his grandparents’ home in 
Louisiana. Id. ^ 38. InforMed agreed and on August 15, 2011 the Plaintiff signed a second 
Telecommuting Agreement which was substantially identical to the first. Id. ^ 39. To avoid 
interference between his grandparents’ personal telephone calls and InforMed business, the 
Plaintiff installed a second phone line at his remote office in Louisiana. Id. ^  40-41.
In September 2011, Caire’s grandmother in Louisiana, with whom he had been 
especially close, died. Id. ^ 51. Within a few days, his other grandmother also died. Id. 
These losses were very traumatic and the Plaintiff experienced exacerbated mental health 
issues. Id. The Plaintiff returned to Maryland to resume telecommuting from his home, but 
his grief led to a worsening of his Major Depressive Disorder and related symptoms. Id.  ^
54. The Plaintiff alleges that upon his return to InforMed, he noticed that his supervisor Ms.
6
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Howard and Defendant Camp treated him differently than they had before. Id. ^ 52.
In January of 2012, the Plaintiff informed Ms. Howard and Defendant Camp that he 
needed to take between one and one-and-a-half weeks off, followed by intermittent leave, to 
treat his depression. Id. ^ 55. His Family Medical Leave Act certification noted that he had 
a “lifelong condition” marked by symptoms of “low mood, anhedonia (inability to 
experience pleasure), anxiety, depression, crying spells, loss of energy, memory and 
concentration, as well as irritability, restlessness and difficulty sleeping.” Id. ^ 56. The 
certification indicated that Caire may need inpatient hospitalization, extended time off for 
follow-up treatment, and fourteen days or more off per month if he experienced an 
exacerbation of his illness. Id. ^ 57. After considering his FMLA certification and Notice of 
Eligibility and Rights and Responsibilities, Defendant Camp approved the FMLA leave 
request on January 14, 2012. Id. ^ 58. The Plaintiff began his FMLA leave period on 
January 30, 2012. Id. ^ 59. Just two days later, on February 1, 2012, the Plaintiff was 
terminated.4 Id. ^ 62.
In the termination letter, the Defendants’ stated reasons for terminating the Plaintiff 
were that he violated the Telecommuting Agreement by failing to install a separate phone 
line solely for InforMed business, using a personal voicemail greeting for InforMed callers, 
and using a portion of his expense allowance for his personal phone line. Id. ^ 63. Ms. 
Howard informed the Plaintiff that she disagreed with the decision to terminate him. Id.  ^
69. The Plaintiff, in an email to Defendant Camp, stated, “I do not feel that my termination
4 The Plaintiff alleges that another InforMed employee, Elaine Long, also missed work because of 
serious depression and was placed on a performance improvement plan. She was not allowed to 
miss additional time to treat her depression even though she had accrued sick leave that she was 
entitled to use. Id. ^ 68.
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reason on my letter is accurate with the situation.” Id. ^ 64. Defendant Camp forwarded a 
second letter stating that the primary reason for his termination was that he did not install a 
second phone line for a five-and-a-half month period while telecommuting. Id. ^ 65. In the 
second letter, Defendant Camp further stated that if Caire did not cease speaking with 
InforMed employees, he could be “subject to legal action.” Id.
After being terminated from InforMed, the Plaintiff applied for unemployment 
benefits through the Maryland Division of Labor, Licensing and Regulation. Id. ^ 70. 
InforMed challenged his right to unemployment benefits because he had been terminated 
for “misconduct.” Id. On March 23, 2012, a hearing examiner for the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeals Division determined that Caire had not committed misconduct and “did 
not commit a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer.” Id. The 
Plaintiff alleges that while working as an InforMed customer service representative, both on­
site and telecommuting, he was a model employee who met or exceeded the requirements of 
the position. Id. ^  16, 36.
The Plaintiff also filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ^ 71. According to the Plaintiff, in filings 
submitted to the EEOC in August of 2012, the Defendants conceded that the Plaintiff was 
not required to maintain a separate phone line at his home office for telecommuting. Id. ^
72.
On January 31, 2013, the Plaintiff initiated arbitration proceedings with the American 
Arbitration Association (“AAA”). Id. ^ 83. Then, on February 14, 2013, counsel for the 
Defendants sent letters to the AAA and to the Plaintiff indicating their refusal to arbitrate
8
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before the AAA. Id. ^ 85. InforMed indicated that it did not consent to allow the AAA to 
administrate the arbitration, did not agree to the AAA’s fee structure, and offered to provide 
a list of retired judges to preside, as well as to review any potential candidates the Plaintiff 
wished to propose. Opp. Ex. 5, ECF No. 11-6 at 1. The Defendants further proposed that 
any arbitration proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of the state administrative 
proceedings related to Caire’s disability. Id. at 2. The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on April 24, 
2013. The Defendants filed their Motions to Compel Arbitration or, in the alternative, 
Motions to Dismiss.
I. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has previously noted that “motions to compel arbitration exist in the 
netherworld between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.” Shaffer v. 
ACS Gov’t Servs., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 682, 683 (D. Md. 2004). Where, as here, the 
formation or validity of the arbitration agreement is in dispute, a motion to compel 
arbitration is treated as one for summary judgment. Id. at 684 n.1; Rose v. New Day Fin., 
LLC, 816 F. Supp. 2d 245, 251 (D. Md. 2011). Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome 
of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
A genuine issue over a material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In considering a motion for summary
9
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judgment, a judge’s function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a 
claimed factual dispute to warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. 
Id. at 249.
In undertaking this inquiry, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 
378 (2007). However, this Court must also abide by its affirmative obligation to prevent 
factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 
778-79 (4th Cir. 1993).
ANALYSIS
The Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed pending arbitration 
pursuant to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. The Plaintiff, however, contends 
that the arbitration clause is unenforceable and he is therefore entitled to bring this suit 
before this Court.
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. requires that “an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id. at § 2; see also Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“This text reflects the 
overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc.
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)). The Supreme Court has recently
noted that arbitration agreements “may be invalidated by generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but not by defenses that apply only to
10
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arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___ , 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (citing
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The FAA also requires that a federal court stay any proceedings that present a controversy 
which the parties have agreed to arbitrate. Id. at § 3. Moreover, the FAA “establishes that, 
as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the 
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” 
Moses H. Cone Mem’lHosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
Despite this presumption, agreements to arbitrate are fundamentally about private 
choice. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to 
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” United Steelworkers o f Am. v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). Federal courts have the authority to 
compel arbitration, but in making that determination this Court is mindful that its role is 
limited to determining the “question of arbitrability,” or the “gateway dispute about whether 
the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 
U.S. 79, 84 (2002).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a litigant can 
compel arbitration under the FAA if he can demonstrate “(1) the existence of a dispute 
between the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which 
purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by 
the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of the
11
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defendant to arbitrate the dispute.” Whiteside v. Teltech Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1991). 
“Agreements to arbitrate are construed according to ordinary rules of contract 
interpretation, as augmented by a federal policy requiring that all ambiguities be resolved in 
favor of arbitration.” Gadson v. SuperShuttle Int’l, AW-10-01057, 2011 WL 1231311, at *3 (D. 
Md. Mar. 30, 2011) (citing Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 
710 (4th Cir. 2001)). State contract formation law determines the validity of arbitration
agreements. Concepcion, 563 U .S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 1745-46; Hill v. Peoplesoft USA, Inc., 412
F.3d 540 (4th 2005). In Maryland, “the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made 
[“lex loci contractus”] controls its validity and construction.” Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 
535 A.2d 466, 467 (Md. 1988). As this case involves the issue of the validity of the 
arbitration agreement and because the contract was entered into by the parties in Maryland, 
Maryland law governs.
Under Maryland law, an agreement to arbitrate disputes is enforceable if it is a valid 
contract. Hill, 412 F.3d at 543; see also Cheek v. United Healthcare o f the Mid-Atlantic, Inc, 835
A.2d 656, 661 (Md. 2003). Moreover, “an arbitration clause is a severable contract which is 
enforceable independently from the contract as a whole.” Holmes v. CoverallN. Am., Inc., 649
A.2d 365, 370 (Md. 1994); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’lBhd. o f Teamsters, 561 U .S.___, 130
S. Ct. 2847, 2858 (2010) (Under “the FAA . . . courts treat an arbitration clause as severable 
from the contract in which it appears and enforce it according to its terms unless the party 
resisting arbitration specifically challenges the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself.”). 
To determine the validity of the arbitration agreement, Maryland courts look at the four 
corners of an arbitration provision. See Cheek, 835 A.2d at 664-65; see also Hill, 412 F.3d at
12
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543. As with any contract, the arbitration provision must be supported by adequate 
consideration in order to be valid and enforceable. See Cheek, 835 A.2d at 661.5
A. Continued Employment as Consideration
The Plaintiff argues that he cannot be compelled to arbitrate because the arbitration 
agreement is unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration. The Defendants counter by 
pointing out that by the terms of the Arbitration Policy, the Plaintiff agreed that his hiring 
and continued employment constituted consideration for waiving his rights to a civil court 
action. The Defendants’ argument cannot hold water.
As articulated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Cheek, an arbitration provision 
must be supported by consideration independent of the underlying contract. 835 A.2d at 
667. Employment or continued employment cannot act as consideration for an employee’s 
promise to arbitrate. Cheek, 835 A.2d at 669 (rejecting employer’s argument that providing 
employment or continued employment constituted sufficient consideration because it would 
place the court in the “untenable position of having to go beyond the confines of the 
arbitration agreement itself and into an analysis of the validity of the larger contract”). The 
Defendants argue that this case is distinguishable from Cheek because the InforMed 
Arbitration Policy specifically provides that an employee agrees to arbitrate “[b]y simply 
accepting or continuing employment with InforMed.” ECF No. 18-2 at 10. The
5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that Cheek retains its force 
and is not preempted by the FAA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion. See Noohi v. 
Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 612 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has never held that the FAA 
preempts state law rules requiring that arbitration provisions themselves contain consideration (i.e., 
that they not be illusory), and it would require a substantial extension of existing precedent to do so 
here.”).
13
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Defendants cannot escape the rule clearly stated in Cheek by placing explicit language in the 
arbitration provision. The Defendants’ argument in this regard has specifically been rejected
by this Court. Raglani v. Ripken Professional Baseball,___F. Supp. 2d___ , 2013 WL 1633053,
at *4 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2013). In Raglani, Judge Blake of this Court held that an arbitration 
clause that by its express language purported to “create a binding legal obligation . . . in 
consideration of [plaintiff s] hiring for employment or [her] continued employment,” was
not supported by consideration under Cheek. ___F. Supp. 2 d ___ , 2013 WL 1633053, at
*4. Indeed, to accept the Defendants’ reasoning on this point would compel a finding that 
consideration exists whenever performance of the contract has occurred. See Cheek, 835 
A.2d at 664-65. Despite the language of the Arbitration Policy, employment or continued 
employment was not adequate consideration for the Plaintiff’s promise to arbitrate.
B. A Mutual Promise To Arbitrate
Because continued employment cannot serve as consideration for a promise to 
arbitrate, this Court must determine whether Defendants have given adequate consideration 
in the form of a mutual promise to arbitrate. In Cheek, Maryland’s highest court determined 
that the mutual exchange of promises to arbitrate disputes represented the necessary 
consideration in support of an arbitration agreement. 835 A.2d at 665 (“[M]utual promises 
to arbitrate act as an independently enforceable contract . . . [i.e.,] each party has promised to 
arbitrate disputes arising from an underlying contract, and ‘each promise provides 
consideration for the other.’” (quoting Holmes, 649 A.2d at 370)).
In this case, the Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Policy does not bind the 
Defendants to arbitrate and therefore there is no mutual agreement. The language of the
14
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Arbitration Policy is one-sided: “the company requests that you  agree”; “no other action can 
be brought by employees’; “you  automatically agree”; “you  agree to waive all your rights.” ECF 
No. 18-2 at 10. Nowhere does the employer agree to be bound by arbitration. Id.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Noohi v. Toll Brothers, Inc. addressed this Court’s 
consideration of an arbitration agreement between a prospective home buyer and real estate 
developer to determine whether the terms sufficiently bound both parties to constitute a 
mutual promise to arbitrate. 708 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit affirmed this 
Court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to stay the lawsuit pending arbitration, holding that 
the arbitration provision bound only the plaintiffs, and was thus unenforceable for lack of 
mutual consideration. 708 F.3d at 611. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “all the 
subject and verb pairings relate to the buyer’s obligations (i.e., buyer agrees, buyer waives, 
etc.); nowhere does the provision state “Buyer and Seller agree,” or the passive “it is agreed,” 
“the provision adds additional procedures that only the buyer must perform prior to 
initiating arbitration, such as giving the seller written notice of each claim and an opportunity 
to cure any default,” and “all the types of claims given as examples in the provisions are 
claims that the buyer would bring against the seller.” Id. at 610. The Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “longstanding grammatical, linguistic, and ‘plain language’ principles make 
clear that the provision did not bind [the real estate developer] to arbitration.” Id. at 611.6
6 The situation presented in Noohi is closely analogous to this case, with one significant factual 
difference. The arbitration clause at issue in Noohi made clear that the seller retained the right to sue 
while the buyer was bound to arbitrate. 708 F.3d at 611 (seller’s waiver of right to a court 
proceeding for any counterclaims expressly contemplated that the seller could bring claims in court 
but the buyer could not). Although there is no such language in this case, the Arbitration Policy is, 
at best, ambiguous with regard to the employer’s obligation. Therefore, the reasoning articulated in 
Noohi applies. Id. at 611 n.6 (explaining that while ambiguity in scope is resolved in favor of
15
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As in Noohi, the Arbitration Policy in this case contains almost exclusively subject- 
verb pairings relating to the employee and examples of claims that would only be brought by 
an employee. Likewise, the Arbitration Policy imposes additional notice requirements on 
employees to initiate arbitration proceedings. 708 F.3d at 610. The Defendants argue that 
certain phrases written in the passive voice could be read in isolation to bind both parties. 
See, e.g., ECF No. 18-2 at 10 (“This arbitration shall be the exclusive means of resolving any 
dispute arising out of your employment or termination from employment by InforMed or 
you, and no other action can be brought by an employee in any court or any other forum.”). 
However, “This arbitration” refers to the examples of claims made by the employee in the 
previous two sentences. Id. (“claims of unlawful termination based on race, sex, national 
origin, disability, breach of contract or any other bias prohibited by law” and “claims of 
unlawful discrimination or harassment under federal or state statutes”). Moreover, the 
sentence cited by the Defendants as clearly binding both parties concludes by stating, “and 
no other action can be brought by an employee in any court or any other forum.” Id. (emphasis 
added). This second clause makes clear that arbitration is the exclusive avenue for an 
employee to resolve disputes, but does not bind the employer. The parties’ obligations need 
not be identical for an arbitration agreement to be valid, Walther, 872 A.2d at 748, but there 
must be some mutual promise. See id. (enforcing arbitration agreement allowing defendant 
to litigate certain specific claims instead of arbitrating).
To be sure, when it is clear that both parties are bound there is no need to expressly 
state that the employer agrees to arbitrate. ONeil v. Hilton HeadHosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274
arbitration, there is no presumption of validity in ambiguous agreements). It is noteworthy that the 
Defendants do not address Noohi, or the Plaintiff s arguments based on that case.
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(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that although the arbitration clause did not expressly bind the 
employer, the provision “clearly implied that both the employer and the employee would be 
bound by the arbitration process”). However, InforMed is not clearly bound in this case. 
Even if there is any ambiguity as to whether passive phrases in the arbitration agreement 
serve to bind both parties, “the presumption in favor of arbitration does not apply to 
questions of an arbitration provision’s validity, rather than its scope.” Id. at 611 n.6 (citing
Granite Rock Co. v. Int’lBhd. o f Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287,___, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857-58 (2010)).
As a whole, the plain language of the Arbitration Policy serves to bind the employee but not 
the employer. There is no mutual promise to arbitrate and the agreement is therefore 
unenforceable for lack of consideration.
C. Illusory Promise Based on Unfettered Discretion
The Plaintiff also argues that the Arbitration Policy is not supported by mutual 
consideration because the Defendants, by retaining the right to alter the terms of the 
arbitration agreement at any time, did not bind themselves to arbitration. Where a party 
reserves the right to “alter, amend, modify or revoke” an arbitration agreement, the promise 
to arbitrate is illusory and the arbitration agreement is unenforceable for lack of 
consideration. Cheek, 835 A.2d at 662, 669. An arbitration agreement that binds one party 
to arbitrate while allowing the other to choose its forum is unsupported by a mutual 
promise. See Howard v. King’s Crossing, Inc., 264 F. App’x. 345, 347 (4th Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam) (applying Cheek to hold that a provision binding buyer but allowing seller to choose 
to arbitrate or to sue for specific performance or damages was a “nonexistent” promise).
In this case, the Arbitration Policy is contained within the employee handbook. Also
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within the employee handbook is the “Receipt and Acknowledgment of InforMed Employee 
Manual” which states that “the policies and benefits described in it are subject to change at 
the sole discretion of InforMed at any time.” ECF No. 18-2 at 13. The “Receipt” also states 
that the employee “understand[s] the Arbitration Policy contained in this Employee Manual 
and [agrees] to abide by the policy.” Id. Thus, InforMed purports to retain the discretion to 
arbitrate or not. This is a “nonexistent” promise. Howard, 264 F. App’x at 347; Cheek, 835 
A.2d at 662 (holding that employer who retained discretion to alter arbitration clause at any 
time made “no real promise at all”).
The Defendants argue that unlike in Cheek, where the language allowing unfettered 
discretion to alter or amend the agreement was in the arbitration clause itself, to analyze the 
Defendants’ authority to change the arbitration clause this case would require this Court to 
improperly look beyond the arbitration provision. Cheek, 835 A.2d at 664-65 (emphasizing 
the narrow scope of a court’s review of arbitrability). On this point, this Court has 
distinguished Cheek in cases where an employee handbook and the arbitration provision were 
separate documents. See, e.g., Ratliff' v. CoStar Realty Information, Inc., No. DKC-11-0813, 2011 
WL 2680585, at *4 (D. Md. July 7, 2011) (“Here, it is undisputed that the agreement to 
arbitrate was not a policy or benefit contained in the employee handbook.”). The opposite is 
true of the InforMed employee handbook. The arbitration provision is a policy described in 
the employee manual, therefore, the clause stating that such a policy is subject to change at 
the sole discretion of InforMed directly applies to the Arbitration Policy.7 InforMed’s
7 For this reason, this case is also distinguishable from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hill v. 
Peoplesoft USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 2005). In Hill, the Fourth Circuit held that where an 
arbitration clause unambiguously bound both parties, the employer’s discretion to change certain
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promise to arbitrate is therefore illusory. Indeed, InforMed sought to exercise this discretion 
by choosing to reject the AAA as the arbitration administrator and only proceed on terms it 
dictated. The arbitration agreement is void because InforMed made no promise to arbitrate 
at all.
D. Unconscionability
The Plaintiff also argues that the Arbitration Policy is unenforceable because it is 
unconscionable. For a contract to be found void as unconscionable, “Maryland courts 
require a showing of procedural unconscionability—‘one party’s lack of meaningful choice’ 
in making the contract—and substantive unconscionability—contract terms that 
‘unreasonably favor’ the more powerful party.” Rose, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (quoting 
Walther, 872 A.2d at 744).
As to the formation of the agreement, the Plaintiff received an offer letter outlining 
the terms of employment that did not mention arbitration. On the first day of work, the 
Plaintiff was given an employee manual that contained the Arbitration Policy within it. The 
Plaintiff states that he was not allowed time to read the various materials on arbitration 
before signing them. Under Maryland law, however, a party who signs an agreement is 
presumed to know its contents and will be bound by them. Dieng v. Colleg Park Hyundai, No 
DKC-09-0068, 2009 WL 2096076, at *5 (D. Md. July 9, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs were 
bound to an agreement that they “did not have or take the time to read and understand” 
absent “something more”). Even so, while failing to read a contract before signing it is not
separate internal dispute resolution procedures was outside the arbitration clause, and it was error to 
conclude that there was no mutual promise to arbitrate. Id. In this case, InforMed retained the 
power to alter any provision, including the Arbitration Policy.
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by itself grounds to find that entering the contract was procedurally unconscionable, the fact 
that the Plaintiff was not even allowed to read the terms of arbitration before signing does 
suggest that he had no meaningful choice in the matter.
In addition to the Plaintiff s lack of opportunity to read the arbitration clause before 
signing, the arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion. A contract of adhesion is one 
that is “drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave- 
it’ basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms.” 
Walther, 872 A.2d at 746 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187, cmt. b). 
Even if the Plaintiff had read the Arbitration Policy, based on the evidence it is reasonable to 
conclude that any request to change any of its terms would not have been entertained. See 
Rose, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 257 (finding that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that 
contracts presented on an as-is, take-it-or-leave-it basis were procedurally unconscionable 
contracts of adhesion). While the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff never actually 
requested any changes with regard to the arbitration policy, this fact is of no moment. It 
would be patently unfair to bind an employee with little or no bargaining power to a contract 
he was not allowed time to read because he failed to attempt to bargain for a change to the 
very terms he had not been able to read. There is evidence that this was a contract of 
adhesion that was entered into in a procedurally unconscionable manner.
As to the substance of the agreement, the Plaintiff argues that the arbitration 
agreement is unconscionable because it denies him access to a neutral arbitral forum. 
Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173, 181 (4th Cir. 2013). In addition to a lack of 
mutual consideration and InforMed’s sole discretion to alter the agreement’s terms, the
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Arbitration Policy is unconscionable because there is no mechanism for selecting a neutral
arbitrator and it states no rules by which the arbitration will proceed. Raglani,___F. Supp.
2 d ___ , 2013 WL 1633053, at *6-7 (holding that an arbitration agreement that allowed
employer to choose arbitrator and insufficiently defined rules by which arbitration would be 
conducted denied employee neutral arbitral forum). Moreover, in response to the Plaintiff s 
attempt to arbitrate before the AAA, a recognized neutral forum the Defendants made clear 
that they would only arbitrate on terms they deemed favorable. Together, these additional 
disparities unreasonably favor the Defendants.8 Viewing the agreement as a whole, the 
Arbitration Policy is substantively unconscionable.
E. Estoppel
Finally, despite the fact that the Plaintiff attempted to arbitrate this dispute before 
filing suit, he is not estopped from opposing the Defendants’ Motions to Compel 
Arbitration. Equitable estoppel is not available to the Defendants to compel arbitration in 
this case. The case on which the Defendants primarily rely analyzes the principles of 
equitable estoppel as it pertains to a non-signatory party’s ability to enforce an arbitration 
clause in a contract. Wachovia Bank, Nat’lA ss ’n v. Schmidt, 445 F.3d 762, 769-71 (4th Cir. 
2006). In this case, the Defendant InforMed is a signatory party to the arbitration 
agreement, and must rely on the contract itself for enforcement. As discussed, the 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable. Moreover, by initiating arbitration proceedings with
8 The Plaintiff argues that requiring him to share the cost of the arbitrator and court reporter equally 
with the employer is substantively unconscionable. In support, the Plaintiff cites only the base salary 
he earned at InforMed, without evidence of the likely cost of arbitration or an analysis of the value 
of his claim. The Plaintiff has not shown that costs would be so prohibitive as to deny access to a 
neutral arbitral forum. Muriithi, 712 F.3d at (plaintiff failed to provide evidence that he would incur 
prohibitive costs in arbitration).
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the AAA, the Plaintiff was simply attempting to preserve his rights in the face of the onerous 
requirements placed upon him by the Arbitration Policy. The Plaintiff gained no benefit, 
and there was no reliance by or prejudice to either of the Defendants. Dickerson v. Longoria, 
995 A.2d 721, 742-43 (Md. 2010) (“To assert equitable estoppel, the asserting party must 
have been misled to his or her injury and have changed his or her position for the worse, 
having believed and relied on the representations of the party sought to be estopped.” 
(citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)). To the contrary, the 
Defendants sought to stay the arbitration process and control any proceedings that would 
follow. The Defendants’ equitable estoppel argument is rejected.
On the whole, “courts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is 
satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor . . . i t s
enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.” Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. a t___,
130 S. Ct. at 2858 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). Neither condition is met here. 
Because the arbitration agreement is void and unenforceable, this Court must turn to the 
substance of the Plaintiff s claims.
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Defendants argue, in the alternative, that if the arbitration clauses are held not to be 
valid and enforceable, this Court should dismiss Count II against Defendant Camp9 and 
Counts III and IV against Defendant Conifer Value-Based Care, LLC pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
9 Count II is the only claim against Defendant Camp.
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Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain 
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the 
dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 
purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests 
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City o f 
Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), “require that complaints in civil actions be alleged 
with greater specificity than previously was required.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 
(4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly articulated 
“[t]wo working principles” that courts must employ when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, while a court must accept as true all the factual 
allegations contained in the complaint, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not 
afforded such deference. Id. (stating that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim); see also 
Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Coyart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we are 
constrained to take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not accept 
legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or 
arguments.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)).
Second, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “a plausible claim for 
relief.” Id. at 679. Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain “more than
23
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labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although the plausibility requirement does not impose a 
“probability requirement,” id. at 556, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Robertson v. Sea 
Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A complaint need not make a case 
against a defendant or forecast evidence sufficient to prove an element of the claim. It need only 
allege facts sufficient to state elements of the claim.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). In short, a court must “draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense” to determine whether the pleader has stated a plausible claim for relief. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
ANALYSIS
A. Defendant Camp’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Camp moves for dismissal of the Plaintiff s FMLA claim against her in 
Count II. While conceding that she may be held individually liable under the FMLA,10 
Defendant Camp argues that the Plaintiff cannot state an FMLA claim on the ground that 
Camp is not an “employer” within the meaning of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I)
10 Whether the FMLA imposes liability on employee supervisors in their individual capacities is an 
open question in the Fourth Circuit. Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F. App’x 366, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (vacating district court’s summary dismissal of plaintiff s FMLA claim against individual 
defendants as frivolous without expressing any opinion on the viability of the claim). This Court has 
recognized that private sector supervisors can be held individually liable under the language of the 
FMLA. Reed v. Md., D ept o f Human Resources, No. ELH-12-472, 2013 WL 489985, at *13 (D. Md. 
Feb. 7, 2013) (“Congress specifically provided for individual liability in the private sector under § 
2611(4)(A)(ii)(I).”). Indeed, a majority of federal courts to address the issue of private supervisor 
liability have concluded that such liability exists. See, e.g., Benton v. Belk, Inc., No 9:12-766-RMG- 
BHH, 2012 WL 5381209, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2012), report & recommendation adopted in fu ll by 2012 
WL 53581335 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2012) (noting the majority rule and collecting cases).
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(“The term “employer”— . . . includes—“any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the 
interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.”). In the private sector,11 
a supervisor must have “sufficient responsibility or stature within the [defendant employer] 
to warrant the imposition of personal liability under the FMLA.” Benton v. Belk, Inc., No 
9:12-766-RMG-BHH, 2012 WL 5381209, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2012), report & 
recommendation adopted in fu ll by 2012 WL 53581335 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2012) (quoting Williamson 
v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc, No. 03-2538-KHV, 2005 WL 1593603, at *9 (D. Kan. July 6, 2005)). 
The relevant inquiry is to what extent the supervisor exerted control over the plaintiff7 s 
FMLA rights. Benton, 2012 WL 5381209, at *2 (“[T]he FMLA has been interpreted to 
impose individual liability on employees of covered private sector employers if the employee 
exercises an adequate amount of control over the plaintiff s ability to exercise his or her 
FMLA rights.” (quoting Brown v. CBK, No. 1:05-1171-T-AN, 2005 WL 3263873, at *2 (W.D. 
Tenn. Nov. 28, 2005))).
In this case, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Camp was InforMed’s Director of 
Human Resources, “a position of significant authority which reports dierectly to InforMed’s 
Chief Executive Officer.” Compl. ^ 8. The Plaintiff reported his medical condition to 
Camp, requested FMLA leave from Camp, submitted the necessary paperwork to Camp, and 
received approval for leave through an email from Camp. Id. ^  20, 52, 55-58. The Plaintiff 
also alleges that the letter terminating him was signed by Camp, and that in later emails,
11 More debate exists among the circuit courts of appeals, within the Fourth Circuit, and even within 
this District as to whether there is individual liability in the public sector. Compare Sadowski v. U.S. 
PostalServ, 643 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752-57 (D. Md. 2009), mth Reed, 2013 WL 489985, at *7-14 (D. Md. 
Feb. 7, 2013). This is a separate inquiry based largely on principles of statutory interpretation not at 
issue with regard to individual liability for private sector supervisors.
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Camp reiterated the reasons for his termination and stated that he could be subject to legal 
action if he communicated further with InforMed employees. Id. ^  62-64. As Defendant 
Camp points out, the Plaintiff does not specifically allege that Camp had the authority to 
make those decisions. Nevertheless, viewing the facts alleged as true, this Court concludes 
that a reasonable inference flows from those facts that Defendant Camp had the authority 
to, and did exercise control over the Plaintiff7 s FMLA rights and his employment at large. 
Therefore, the Plaintiff has pled a plausible claim against Defendant Camp in her individual 
capacity. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count II against Defendant Camp is denied.
B. Defendant InforMed’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant InforMed moves to dismiss the Plaintiff s claims for wrongful discharge 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 in Count III and 
Maryland Code Ann., State Government § 20-601, et seq. in Count IV. The Defendant 
argues that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because 
he is not a “qualified individual with a disability” and there is no causal connection between 
his disability and his termination.12
The ADA prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, “[t]he 
term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without accommodation can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). As to Maryland law claims alleging violations of State 
Government Article § 20-601, et seq., this Court has recognized that the definitions of 12
12 Defendant InforMed does not appear to contest that the Plaintiff is “disabled” within the meaning 
of the ADA.
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“qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA and the Code of Maryland 
Regulations § 14.03.02.02(B)(10) are “nearly identical.” Lewis v. Univ. o f Md., Balt., No. SAG- 
12-298, 2012 WL 5193820, at *4 n.3 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2012) (“Maryland courts have used 
interpretations of the ADA for guidance when the ADA is substantially similar to the 
Maryland code at issue.”(citing Ridgely v. Montgomery Cnty, 883 A.2d 182, 193 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2005)). Thus, to prove a disability discrimination claim under either federal or 
Maryland law, a plaintiff must make the same showing that he is a “qualified individual with 
a disability.”
Defendant InforMed argues that the Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a 
disability because he could not “attend work on a regular and consistent basis.” ECF No. 
11-1 at 18. The Fourth Circuit has noted that “a regular and reliable level of attendance is a 
necessary element of most jobs.” Tyndall v. Nat’lEduc. Ctrs, Inc. o f Cal.., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).13 The Plaintiff in this case performed the job of customer 
service representative, both on-site and by telecommuting, for approximately sixteen 
months, with a period of time away from work to address his health issues shortly after he 
was hired. Compl. ^ 18. In January of 2012, the Plaintiff informed InforMed that he would 
need between one and one-and-a-half weeks of FMLA leave. Id. ^ 55. His FMLA 
certification indicated that if his condition worsened he may need inpatient care for an 
extended period followed by possible intermittent leave. Id. ^ 56. While his FMLA 
authorization speculated that i f  he had further episodes of major depression, he may be
13 In Tyndall, the Fourth Circuit recognized that attendance may not be required in a job where an 
employee can work completely from home. 31 F.3d at 213. The Plaintiff in this case, as a 
telecommuter, did not “attend” work in the traditional sense. Plaintiff Complaint makes clear, 
however, that he required a period of time where he would perform no work, even from home.
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required to miss significant amount of work, the Plaintiff had only missed two days of 
FMLA-approved time when he was terminated. The Plaintiff had not demonstrated a level 
of absenteeism that would render him unqualified under the ADA.
The cases cited by Defendant InforMed are inapposite. In Tyndall., the plaintiff was 
an instructor at a career training program for medical assistants. 31 F.3d at 211. She had 
been absent for more than forty work days in seven months in connection with her own 
disability and the disability of a dependent. Id. at 211-12. The Tyndall plaintiff had missed 
the beginning of two instructional cycles, and when she asked to miss a third, the employer 
terminated her. Id. In Terns, the plaintiff was terminated when she failed to return to her 
job at the end of her FMLA leave period. 2012 WL 5193820, at *2. The plaintiff did not 
communicate with her employer while on leave as required by the applicable internal policy, 
and her doctor did not clear her to return to work until weeks after she was terminated. Id. 
Neither situation is factually analogous to this case. In sum, the Plaintiff has alleged 
adequate facts to state that he was a qualified individual with a disability, Robertson, 679 F.3d 
at 291, and Defendant InforMed’s Motion to Dismiss on that basis fails.
InforMed also argues that the Plaintiff has failed to state an ADA claim because he 
has not sufficiently alleged a causal connection between being disabled and being terminated. 
A plaintiff alleging wrongful discharge on the basis of disability must prove that his disability 
was motivating factor for his termination. Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th 
Cir. 1999). In Baird, the Fourth Circuit held that although the plaintiff s absenteeism may 
have played a role in her exclusion from the school choir, her complaint stated adequate
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factual allegations that discrimination on the basis of her depression was a motivating factor 
in the decision. 192 F.3d at 470.
Although the Plaintiff alleges that he first disclosed his disability to InforMed in 
October of 2010, he was not terminated until February 1, 2012. Thus, the employer’s mere 
knowledge of his disability is inadequate by itself to establish the required causal connection 
for termination more than a year later. See Sharma v. Howard Cnty, No. JKB-12-2269, 2013 
WL 530948, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 12, 2013) (dismissing ADA claim where plaintiff informed 
employer of disability in 2008 but was not terminated until 2011). Just before the Plaintiff 
was terminated, however, InforMed granted the Plaintiff’s application for FMLA leave, 
which contained statements from his health care providers that he may be required to miss 
significant amounts of time for treatment of his depression. Although InforMed knew of 
the Plaintiff s depressive disorders almost a year-and-a-half earlier, in the interim, he lost two 
close family members, and the Plaintiff alleged that InforMed personnel started treating him 
differently. His subsequent FMLA application contained new information regarding his 
disability and its severity. Then, InforMed terminated him just two days after the start of his 
approved FMLA leave period. Based on this close temporal proximity, the Plaintiff has 
adequately alleged that his disability was a motivating factor in his termination.
In addition, InforMed’s proffered reasons for terminating the Plaintiff are 
inconsistent. The termination letter stated that he was discharged for violating the 
Telecommuting Agreement because he failed to install a separate business phone line, 
improperly used his expense allowance to pay for the personal phone line, and used a 
personal voicemail greeting. The Plaintiff has alleged facts that, if taken as true as they must
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be at this stage, cast some doubt on InforMed’s true motivation. Indeed, in its Motion, 
InforMed states that the Plaintiff was terminated for “failure to follow company protocol, 
insubordination, and misuse of funds.” ECF No. 11-1 at 4 n.2. Insubordination was not 
mentioned by InforMed personnel in any of the communications informing the Plaintiff of 
the reasons for his termination. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants admitted to 
the EEOC that he was not required to have a separate business phone line to telecommute. 
InforMed states, “These issues are obviously in dispute, but are not material to the present 
Motion.” Id. In light of InforMed’s equivocation with regard to the reasons for terminating 
the Plaintiff, this “obvious” dispute is material. Moreover, the Plaintiff has alleged facts that 
another employee who had a disability was placed on a performance improvement plan and 
not allowed to miss work despite having accrued sick leave. This suggests that disability may 
have played a role in the Defendants’ conduct regarding leave. Applying the motivating 
factor standard, the Plaintiff has alleged adequate facts to state a claim under the ADA and 
Maryland law for discrimination on the basis of disability. Thus, for foregoing reasons, the 
Motion to Dismiss Count III and IV as against InforMed is denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motions (ECF Nos. 10 & 11) are 
DENIED.
A separate Order follows.
Dated: November 8, 2013 ___________ /s/___________________
Richard D. Bennett 
United States District Judge
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